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such a requirement cannot be implied. The court did not discuss this argu-
ment in very great detail and it is not clear whether such a discussion might
not elicit a more definite congressional intent one way or the other
It would seem that in discussing federal "strike" suit prevention the
court should have discussed Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This rule prohibits the settlement of derivative suits without the permission
of the court, thereby apparently eliminating the cause of "strike" suits. The
decision of the court on these particular facts seems to be correct. However,
if the court were going to preface the decision with a policy discussion, it
might have given a more complete treatment by including a discussion of
Rule 23. If Rule 23 can be interpreted to prevent the "strike" suit, then
federal security for expenses requirements must be justified on other grounds
or they should be eliminated. Security for expenses legislation has had a
long and controversial history in both state and federal courts. Perhaps the
utilization of Rule 23 could satisfy both sides. It would, on the one hand,
prevent the "strike" suit and, on the other hand, would relieve the minority
shareholder of the security for expenses burden.
Of course, the elimination of security for expenses requirements from
federal laws is a legislative rather than a judicial function. However, if
Federal Rule 23 does eliminate the need for security for expenses perhaps
the courts could aid Congress by pointing this out. If in judicial discussion
of this problem the courts showed agreement on the impact of Rule 23 on
security for expenses requirements, then the legislature would be better
able to act. The courts cannot disregard existing laws but they can show
that certain provisions have become unnecessary due to subsequent enact-
ments thereby giving the legislature cause to reexamine their original
position.
JAMES M. QUINN
Fair Trade Laws—Non-Signer Clauses—Constitutionality.—Hudson
Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co.; Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly El Co. 1--
The plaintiff is the operator of retail stores which sell pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. The defendants are the manufacturers of pharmaceuticals which they
distribute to retailers either directly or through wholesalers. The defendants
independently entered into a number of written contracts with retail stores in
Ohio for the purpose of determining the retail price of their commodities,
and served notice of these contracts on the plaintiff. The plaintiff purchased
the defendants' trade-marked products in interstate commerce from a third
party, with notice of the established retail price in Ohio. He then proceeded
to sell these articles at prices below those fixed by the defendants. The de-
fendants individually sought to enjoin the plaintiff from selling their products
for less than the established prices. In so doing, they claimed the protection
of the Ohio Fair Trade Act, which makes the purchase of a trade-marked or
trade named commodity for resale, with knowledge of the existence of fair
trade contract prices, an implied contract to comply with these prices, even
1 176 N.E.2d 236, Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) 70,065 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
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though the purchaser was not a signer of such a contract. 2 The plaintiff then
sought a declaratory judgment, against each of the defendants, that the fair
trade act was invalid and unconstitutional. Although heard separately, the
court considered these cases together because they involved the same ques-
tions. In the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio, Cuyahoga County, the fair
trade act was declared to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to private persons . 2 The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Cuyahoga County,
reversed. HELD: The fair trade act is not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to private persons. The statute merely prescribes the con-
duct which is to constitute an implied contract, and such private contracts
are not legislative in character.
In most states, fair trade acts are found constitutional where a manu-
facturer is allowed to enforce his resale price maintenance contracts only
against the signers of such contracts.* However, in nearly every state such
acts also declare that the terms of a fair trade agreement between the
manufacturer and any given retailer are binding on all other retailers who
have notice of such agreements, regardless of whether they have consented
to be bound. 5 These "non-signer" clauses have been held unconstitutional
by a majority of courts!' Such decisions declare that "non-signer" clauses
2 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1333.27-1333.34 (Baldwin 1961). Section 1333.28(I)
defines a contract for the purposes of the act as follows:
"Contract" means any agreement, written or verbal, or arising from the acts of
the parties. The establishment by a proprietor of a minimum resale price
for any commodity pursuant to the provisions of section 1333.29 of the Revised
Code and the proprietor's permission for a distributor to acquire and use the
proprietor's interest in the trade-mark or trade name in reselling the commodity
shall constitute a contract and sufficient consideration from the proprietor for
a promise by the distributor not to sell such commodity at less than the mini-
mum price established by the proprietor. Any distributor (whether he acquires
such commodity directly from the proprietor or otherwise) who, with notice
that the proprietor has established a minimum resale price for a commodity,
accepts such commodity shall thereby have entered into an agreement with such
proprietor not to resell such commodity at less than the minimum price stipu-
lated therefor by such proprietor.
3 Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Upjohn Co.; Hudson Distribs., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
Trade Reg. Rep. (1960 Trade Cas.) II 69,778 (Ohio Ct. of C.P. 1960).
4 Of the 46 states which have enacted fair trade acts, only Montana, Nebraska, and
Utah have declared them entirely unconstitutional. Skaggs Drug Center Inc. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., Trade Reg. Rep. (1961 Trade Cas.) § 69,930 (Mont. Sup.
Ct. 1961) ; McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 N.W.2d 608
(1955); General Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956).
6 Whoever knowingly and wilfully advertises, offers for sale, or sells any com-
modity at less than the minimum price stipulated in any contract entered into
under Section 1333.06 of the Revised Code, whether such person advertising,
offering for sale, or selling such commodity is or is not a party to such con-
tract, is engaging in unfair competition and unfair trade practices and is liable to
any person damaged thereby.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.07 (Baldwin 1961). This section was declared unconstitu-
tional in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 182, 147
N.E.2d 481 (1958).
6 Twenty-one states have held their non-signer clauses unconstitutional. These are:
Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. In seventeen states such pro-
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either deprive the retailer of the right to set his own prices without due
process of law,7 or involve an unlawful delegation of legislative power to
private persons .8
In 1958 the Ohio Supreme Court struck down the 1936 Ohio Fair
Trade Act for both of the preceding reasons.° In drafting the new fair
trade act a great deal of reliance was placed on the Virginia Fair Trade Act
of 1959, which provides that a non-signer who accepts goods with notice
of the manufacturer's fair trade price is deemed to have contracted not to
sell them below that price." The Virginia Supreme Court found this pro-
vision constitutional in the case of Standard Drug Co. v. General Elec. Co."
There the manufacturer sold flashbulbs to a retailer with notice of the fair
trade price. The retailer, however, never agreed to comply with such prices,
and later sold them at a lower figure. The court held that a contract had
been made, and that the new act was not subject to the constitutional ob-
jections of non-signer provisions because it only allowed "voluntary" con-
tractual restrictions on minimium resale price. 12
visions have been held valid. These arc: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. See Trade Reg. Rep. 11 6021. See generally, R. K. Bates, The
Constitutionality of State Fair Trade Acts, 32 Ind. L. J. 127 (1957).
7 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 224 Ark. 558, 275 S.W.
2d 455 (1955); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139
(1956) ; Miles Labs., Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1954); Cox v. General Elec. Co.,
211 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955) ; General Elec. Co; v. American Buyer's Coop., Inc., 316
S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958); Shakespeare Corp. v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods
Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 268 (1952) ; General Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons,
159 Neb. 736, 68 N.W.2d 620 (1955) ; Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M.
215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, 167 Ohio St.
182, 147 N.E.2d 481 (1958); General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635
(1956) ; Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636, 99 S.E.2d 665 (1957).
8 Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 455 (1955);
Bissel Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 188, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); Quality
Oil Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958); Dr.
G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts., 231 La. 51, 90
So.2d 243 (1956); Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 102
N.W.2d 528 (1960) ; General Elec. Co. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 159 Neb. 736, 68
N.W.2d 620 (1955) ; General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
9 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, 167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E.2d
481 (1958).
10 Va. Code Ann, §§ 59-8.1 to 59-8.9 (Supp. 1960). § 59-8.2 provides:
The following terms as used in this chapter are defined as follows: .. .
(10) "Contract" means any agreement, written or verbal, or actual notice im-
parted by mail or attached to the commodity or container thereof.
The acceptance of a commodity for resale, after notice imparted by mail
or attached to the commodity or container thereof, shall be prima fade evidence
of actual notice of the terms of the contract. Acceptance for resale with actual
notice shall be deemed to be assent to the terms of the contract.
11 202 Va. 367, 117 S.E.2d 289 (1960).
12 It appears that not only does the present Virginia act clearly meet the condi-
tions required by Old Dearborn for constitutional validity (state and federal),
but by elimination of the "non-signer" provision and substitution of the provision
that permits the voluntary contractual restriction on minimum resale price to
be agreed upon by the manufacturer or distributor and retailer, it has removed
the chief ground and reason relied upon by courts that have held Fair Trade
Acts to be unconstitutional.
117 S.E.2d 289, 295 (1960).
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Two lower courts passed on the 1959 Ohio Fair Trade Act prior to the
present case, and both found it unconstitutional." In Bulova Watch Co. v.
Ontario Store of Columbus, Ohio, 14 it was decided that the 1959 act was an
attempt to retain the compulsion of the "non-signer" clause while avoiding
its unconstitutionality by legislative redefinition of its terms as creating a
"voluntary contract". Since there was no requirement of mutual assent,
the conduct which was deemed to create a contract could not have created
a contract at common law. The statute therefore attempted to bind re-
tailers who had not actually contracted with the manufacturer, and, by so do-
ing, had the same effect as a "non-signer" clause." The dissenting opinion
in the present case follows Bulova Watch." But the majority opinion dis-
regarded these previous Ohio decisions and found the 1959 fair trade act
constitutional because it was within the power of the legislature to define
the terms of an implied contract, and because such private contracts do not
involve a delegation of legislative power." In so doing the Court of Appeals
relied heavily on the Virginia case of Standard Drug v. General Elec. Co."
However, in Standard Drug there was a direct offer to sell on stipulated con-
ditions made by the manufacturer to the retailer, and an acceptance of the
merchandise by the retailer without protest as to the conditions. Such was
a sufficient inferential acceptance of the conditions to satisfy the common
13
 Bulova Watch Co. v. Ontario Store of Columbus, Ohio, 176 N.E.2d 527
(Ohio Ct. of CP. 1961); Helena Rubenstein, Inc. v. Cincinnati Vitamin & Cosmetic
Distrib. Co., 167 N.E.2d 687 (Ohio Ct. of C.P. 1960). In Helena Rubenstein a manu-
facturer sought to enjoin a retailer from selling its products for less than the established
price. The retailer had received notice of these prices in accordance with the terms of
the Ohio Fair Trade Act. The court held that the fair trade act was unconstitutional.
"In construing the present sections, this court is of the opinion that the legislature has
not only failed in attempting to correct the decision in the case of Union Carbide and
Carbon v. Bargain Fair in 1958, but has imposed additional restrictions upon the
individual property owners which are likewise unlawful and unconstitutional." 167
N.E.2d 687, 688.
14 176 N.E.2d 527 (Ohio Ct. of C.F. 1961).
15 At first blush at least, it would seem to be a rather strange legal doctrine
which would say that if one "knowingly and wilfully" sold at less than certain
minimum prices in violation of a specific interdiction of statutory law, such
would nevertheless be legal, but if one did exactly the same thing where the law
said he had agreed to do so (without any regard to true intent), such would
be illegal.
Id. at 531.
16 Judge Hurd also stated;
The great vice in the 1959 Act (as in the 1936 Act) is the delegation of legisla-
tive power to private persons without any proper formula, standard or control
whatsover. Thus those who have the most to gain are granted the greatest
delegation of legislative power, and private persons are permitted unlimited
license to fix and set prices at will. Thus the major effect is to permit private
persons, if they so determine, to increase and maintain high prices, particularly
of drugs and vitamins. In the ordinary course of events this will lead to
monopoly and make it difficult for persons of ordinary means to purchase reg-
ularly those aids to health and well being so necessary under modern condi-
tions. In this respect the interests of the consuming public are totally ignored,
and the retailer is prevented from conducting his business as he sees fit.
Supra note 1, at 252.
17 Supra note 1.
18 Supra note Ii.
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law requirement of mutual assent. This rationale does not apply in Hudson
Distributors because there the goods were purchased from a third party.
Thus, there was no basis for finding the common law requirement of mutual
assent.
The "non-signer" clause of the 1936 Ohio Fair Trade Act stated that
where the manufacturer entered into resale price maintenance agreements
with some retailers in the jurisdiction, all other retailers were bound, whether
they consented or not." The 1959 fair trade act provides that a non-signer
who accepts goods with notice of the manufacturer's established price is
deemed to have contracted not to sell them below this price. 20 Since retailers
who have not dealt directly with the manufacturer cannot be said to have
entered into a common law contract or agreement with him, they are in
effect being bound by the prices set by the manufacturer without their
consent. As previously noted, legislation having this effect was declared
unconstitutional in Ohio when the "non-signer" provision of the 1936 act
was held invalid.
In Hudson Distributors the court may appear to have found a method
of reversing the present trend of declaring unconstitutional fair trade acts
which bind non-signers. However, it is likely that many courts will look
to the effect of the statute rather than to its wording, and come to the con-
clusion that such provisions are subject to the same objections as "non-
signer" clauses.
HENRY S. HEALY
Foreign Corporations—Nationalization—Act of State Doctrine and
Executive Action.—Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.1--Farr, Whit-
lock and Co., hereinafter referred to as Farr-Whitlock, contracted to pur-
chase sugar from a wholly owned Cuban corporate subsidiary of Campania
Azucarera Vertientes—Camaguey, a Cuban corporation controlled by
United States' interests, hereinafter referred to as C.A.V. The sugar was
to be loaded on vessels of Farr-Whitlock's choice at a designated port and
Farr-Whitlock was to make payment in New York upon presentation of
the necessary shipping documents. Loading commenced on August 6, 1960,
and was finished by one p.m. on August 9, 1960. On August 6, 1960, the
Cuban government nationalized the property of C.A.V. pursuant to a law
which allowed the nationalization of Cuban enterprises in which United
States persons, physical and corporate, held a majority interest. The law
declared that this procedure was necessary because of aggressive acts by
the United States, to wit: the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota. Farr-
Whitlock, in order to obtain the necessary consent of the Cuban government
for the departure of the vessel, entered into a contract with plaintiff's
assignor, a corporation wholly owned by the Cuban government, purporting
to sell the sugar on board the vessels to Farr-Whitlock. This contract con-
19 Supra note 5.
20 Supra note 2.
1 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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